[137 cont.]

175 Having spoken in passing of the ancient Kazaks' way of life to show their resemblances to those of today, let us return to what the Oriental writers teach us about them.

This people has been known in Asia for a very long time. As one of the branches of that very numerous race, the Turks, it is no less ancient than the Naimans or the Kirgiz, or any of the [636] Asiatic peoples of the same race. The Kazaks came under the domination of Chingis Khan, and after the death of the conqueror passed in appanage to his son Djuchi, but although they belonged to the Golden Horde, they kept their own khans. For this reason they were sometimes under the dominion of their own main chiefs, and sometimes were joined to the Chagatai horde, that of Almalyk, or that of Tashkent, which was later called the Mogul Ulus.

After the weakening of the powerful states of Djuchi and Chagatai, internal disputes arose within many of the descent lines [races] belonging to the sons and descendants of Chingis Khan, especially among the nomads. The Uzbeks, who had seized Maverannahr and Khorezm, became the most powerful. But not all the peoples contributing to the disorder came under their sway. Some of them joined the Crimean Tatars, others the Mogul uluses, still others the true Tatars, that is, those of Kazan, and finally some joined the Kazak horde. All this took place after the fall of the Golden Horde. Later, when the Uzbeks split up, many of their branches fused with the Kazak horde. In this manner two powerful states were formed at the beginning [138] of the 16th century, in the Kipchak and Chete steppes. The first of these states, the Mogul Ulus, was headed by Khan Dadam, while the second, ruled by Arslan, khan of the Kazaks, was so powerful that it could raise an army of 400,000 men. This is found in the writings of Sultan Baber, founder of the famous empire of the [648] Grand Mogul in India. He gave one of his nieces in marriage to Arslan Khan and was an eyewitness to his power.

175 631 727 In this period several branches or tribes of many of the peoples known in the history of the Orient, and which broke away from the Golden Horde, were united with the Kazaks, either voluntarily or by force. It was at this time that the Kipchaks,

[138 cont.]
175 Naimans, Konrads, Djalairs, and Kankly mingled with the
[631 Kazaks, and their names are preserved in the descent lines,
727] tribes, and most powerful sections of the Kazak hordes.

After joining the Kazaks, some peoples, such as the Durmans, Karluks, etc., parted from them once again to rejoin the Uzbeks. But the Kazaks were reinforced from another side by various Turkic tribes [races] who joined them at the time Tashkent was taken by Shabakht Khan and after the complete destruction of the Mogul Ulus, overthrown by Khan Abdulla.

[69] We should speak here of the descendants of Khan Arslan and of the destiny of the Kazak peoples under their dominion, as well as of the successive revolutions to which they were exposed and the quick overthrow of the power which they had acquired under Arslan. Instead of this, we will content ourselves
[114] with saying that the Kirghiz-Kazak led a nomadic life, had no chronicles nor any other historical monument of this nature, and, consequently, it is impossible to write a complete and coherent history about them.

Nevertheless this people did not remain entirely unknown to us after Arslan Khan. After having lost the thread of events described by the Oriental historians, we begin to find the Kazaks again, or, as they are called [139] today, the Kirghiz-Kazaks, in the works of European travelers and in Russian chronicles; and independently of the evidence which they furnish us, we have the archives to guide us, which preserve unimpeachable testimony of Russia's specific relations with different peoples of Asia.

Herberstein is the first of the European historians (1) to

1. Herberstein arrived in Moscow for the first time in 1517 and for the second time in 1526. See Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. VII, notes 165 ff.

speak of the Kazak horde. Having twice been ambassador of the Holy Roman Emperor to Tsar Ivan Vasilievich, and having

[150 cont.]

175 replied by [151] promising to be obedient to Russia in all things.
643 These relations had no sequel, however, for Prince Gagarin was
[662] recalled to Moscow shortly after, and Tiavka, the oldest and most cautious of the khans, died. His companions did not know enough to profit from this favorable situation. Instead of joining together again to ask Russia's protection against the Dzungars, they
[578] began to quarrel among themselves, and without any thought of the general welfare they continued in their usual calling, that is, they pillaged all their neighbors. And Russia, who had offered them help and protection, was not the last to suffer from
[726] this. Not content with their frequent raids across the borders of Siberia, in that same year, 1717, they moved in as far as Novo-Sheshminsk (in the Kazan guberniya), took the city, and laid it waste, and although they were driven out with great losses, they
● [727] took away a large number of prisoners. This last expedition was made by the subjects of Khan Abulkhair (1). Kaip was afraid

1. See Rychkov's History of Orenburg /Istoriia Orenburgskaia/ and governor
[643] Nepluev's reports to the senate. Rychkov does not say who commanded the Kazaks in this expedition, but Nepluev says that it was Khan Abulkhair, who later became a subject of the Russian empire.

that it might be attributed to him and that he might be punished, although innocent, for the crime of his rival, so he sent a letter
[729] in 1718 to Peter I, in which he offered perpetual peace and alliance (2).

2. This letter, as well as the reply made to it by the governor of Kazan, is still preserved today /1832/ in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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721
726 This letter, however, did not stop the just vengeance of the dwellers along the border, who were annoyed by the constant

[152 cont.]
175 their wives and children. Finally, the fugutives halted, but in
[167 barren localities offering no support to a nomadic people. It
731] was impossible for the Kazaks to endure such an unhappy situation for long. Of the two scourges which menaced them, it was best to choose the one which promised some advantages, if not for the present at least for the future. Despair drove them to make themselves masters of their old territories, which they could not do without. Danger had snuffed out the flame of dissension and replaced it with unanimity of sentiment, and the efforts of all
[645] were directed to the same end. It was decided in a general assembly of the people to advance, attack the common enemies, and drive them from the lands of the Kazaks. This undertaking was sanctified at once by a common oath to remain faithful to
[643 each other. Khan Abulkhair was chosen as [153] leader of the
782] nation, and the sacrifice of a white horse (1), which was made

1. See the article on "Customs" in the statistical section of this book, for more details. [Not translated.]

according to the custom of this people, was considered a pledge of future peace.

[726] After these preparations the Kazaks advanced, attacked the Dzungas, and won a number of battles against them, and recovered their old lands. But as they expected new attacks from
● [727] Galdan Tsyren, they found it more opportune to move away from this dangerous neighbor, and some retreated to the north, while others moved westward. Only the Great Horde remained near the Dzungars, and they submitted to the latter almost in entirety, as we shall soon see. The Little Horde did not stop at the Emba
175 River, which was formerly the border, when they arrived there,
166 but crossed over to the right bank and attacked the Volga
726 Kalmuks, and after seizing a large part of their pasture lands, they moved all the way to the Ural River. The Middle Horde moved north to the Ori and the Ui, and drove out many Bashkirs from the vicinity of these rivers. Although the strength of the

[160 cont.]

comprised this empire were exterminated or dispersed, and the lands they had occupied remained deserted.

This event brought about two great advantages for the Kazaks. It delivered them from enemies who were as restless as they were dangerous, and it gave them the means of extending their pasture lands over excellent places.

The Bogdo Khan /emperor/ of China was far from being opposed to their occupying the ravaged steppes of Dzungaria, and indeed he tried to attract them there. To halt raids, he established a fortified line between them and their old lands, which is still called the New Line today.

Thus the Kazak Great Horde, which had been constricted for so long, expanded on all sides to turn the best pasture lands to account. The part of this horde which came closest to the Chinese frontier and mixed with some of the remnants of the Dzungars was punished several times by force of arms for its usual brigandage, and it became subject to China and remains among Chinese subjects to this day. The others, who nomadize a little further west, have retained their independence.

Some fractions of these two groups live next to the Buruts, and having often had to fight against them, have become more warlike and dangerous than all the other Kirghiz-Kazaks. We could not enumerate all their continual battles with their neighbors here, but we cannot help mentioning the violent attack they made in 1771 against the Kalmuk Torguts, who were fleeing from Russia under the command of the famous Ubashi.

The man who distinguished himself most in this event was Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, who was known in China for his bravery and who received the title of knight or paladin of the court from the Bogdo Khan (1). When he had learned of the

1. We have taken this information [161] on the exploits of this sultan from the Chinese work by Prince Tsichi [Chi Shih?], which is about the flight of the Torguts and was translated into Russian by Lipovtsov.

[162 cont.]
x 648 726 preferred to humbly ask permission to pass beyond toward the Ili River. Erali pretended to consent but had the intention of striking [662] a most terrible blow against the fleeing prince after having lulled him into security to some extent. And this is exactly what happened. Scarcely had the Kalmuks moved away from the Kazaks and set up their camp to spend the night when Erali and his allies attacked them abruptly, annihilated whole groups which had gone [727] to sleep without taking precautions, and took an immense booty of prisoners, various objects, and livestock. The third part of the Great Horde, which had camped in the neighborhood of Tashkent from the time of Galdan Tsyren, did not move after the annihilation of the Dzungars but began to establish itself on the spot in the localities it occupied, and persecuted the neighboring cities and villages more strongly. Tashkent was the city which suffered most. Raids, the pillage of caravans, and the almost complete loss of arable lands brought about the absolute ruin of its inhabitants. Although they were not subjects of the Kazaks, they were dependent upon them for everything and were obliged to purchase all the necessities of life and trade from them at a high price.

In 1760 a large number of Karakalpaks [Kara-Kalpak] joined this part of the Great Horde. These Karakalpaks lived at the mouth of the Syr [Darya] River, but being hemmed in by the Little Horde, especially under Khan Nurali, they had retreated further east. It is not known why the Kazaks, who were so powerful, did not seize Tashkent completely and establish themselves there. But there is no doubt that this city has had to suffer from their aggressions until our day. The khans of this country, being weak and unenterprising, have tried to avert these raids by favors, gifts, and concessions more than by resistance and [829] vigorous measures. The Kazaks are accustomed to viewing indulgence as [163] a sign of weakness, and consequently this kind of behavior, far from disarming them, leads them to renewed violence.

Tashkent proved the truth of this by its own experience some time later when Iunus Khodja became ruler of this city.

[163 cont.]
x 648 726 He soon saw that the behavior of his predecessors toward the Kazaks had produced general misfortune, and that until this people was brought to reason by force of arms it would not stop tormenting his subjects. He acted in accordance with this political fact and assembled an army with which he attacked the Great Horde in 1798 (1). Luck was with him and he won great victories

1. See the unpublished journal of Pospelov, who was in Tashkent in 1800.

over the oppressors in the first battles. Encouraged by these fortunate beginnings, he continued to pursue them and added to the force of arms punishments which could only be conceived by the imagination of an exasperated Asiatic. He had the prisoners de- [727] capitated and formed pyramids of these heads in the sight of the enemy army. These frightful sights struck the hearts of the Kazaks with inexpressible terror. Lacking true courage and being accustomed to fighting only for pillage, they could not unanimously [721 628] resolve to die to avenge the blood of their brothers. They dreaded slavery, and this fear obliged them to submit to Iunus Khodja.

x 648 Having thus proved the superiority of severity and decision, this prince seized from the Kazaks all the villages which were in [727] their power and not only demanded complete submission in the future but also reparations, according to Asiatic custom, for the pillage and murder done against the residents of Tashkent. Finally [651] he prescribed rules for their litigations and made them pay a tribute of one sheep out of every hundred. In a word, he reduced them completely to the state of subjects, and later he put them in his armies like his own subjects.

We repeat, however, that he did not subjugate the entire [164] Great Horde, for many Kazaks, even among those neighbor- [166] ing him, escaped his power. Several thousand tents retreated to the Irtysh River and joined the Middle Horde, while others gained the Ak-Tau Mountains with their troops, and still others various other places.

The Kazaks who had become subjects of Iunus Khan remained under the domination of Tashkent as long as this city, with the lands which belonged to it, including Turkestan, did not fall under

[185 cont.]

×648 was never sent and still remains today in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg (1).

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of December 30, 1737.

×648 669 The Bashkir revolt had still not been put down. Abulkhair was afraid to take any part in this revolt, and he himself suggested to Tatishchev that he help to subdue the rebels. The higher authority was informed of this proposal and gave permission for it to be accepted (2), authorizing the Khan to enter the land of the

2. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 22, 1738.

Bashkirs, provided however that in acting against the rebels he would leave in peace those who remained loyal and would defend their persons and properties if necessary. In defiance of this order, ×648 726 Abulkhair pillaged the lands of the Bashkirs for two consecutive months without distinguishing between rebels and loyal subjects, and the results proved that he had no other end in proposing his [665] services but to gorge himself and his Kazaks on booty. It is even asserted that he intended to make his son khan of the Bashkirs, ×648 726 and when he entered the lands of this people, he announced himself their protector and defender before the Russian government, ● 727 but when he saw that his deceit was a failure he began the pillage. As a consequence it was commanded that he be made to depart from the lands of the Bashkirs as soon as possible. Tatishchev carried out this order with gentle means and without wrangling.

The son of Abulkhair Khan, Erali, remained in Orenburg as hostage, however.

While Abulkhair was carrying out his ravages against the Bashkirs, part of his horde, which was camping at the mouth of the Ural, renewed its attacks against the Kalmuks and took many Russians prisoners during one of the raids (3). Fearing the just

3. See the reports sent from Astrakhan,

[185 cont.]

and the ukase of February 6, 1738 addressed to Tatishchev, in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

punishment for their misdeeds, Abulkhair and his partisans were terrified to hear that Tatishchev was approaching from Orenburg with troops in the month of July, 1738. They believed that this army, which according to [186] rumor had been joined by several thousand Kalmuks, was coming to punish them, whereas Tatishchev, who was being escorted by the army, had no other purpose but to open meetings with the Khan and the principal Kazak sultans.

Wishing to assure themselves of his intentions, they sent Batyr Bukenbai, of whom we have already spoken and who was universally respected, to meet Tatishchev. The ostensible reason for his mission was to discover at what time Abulkhair should come to Orenburg and the number of sultans who should accompany him. The true reason was to reconnoiter the strength of the army and to find out if there were Kalmuks.

In spite of the fact that Bukenbai had calmed his compatriots on this subject, Abulkhair, who was conscious of his crimes, took a long time to decide to go to Orenburg. He finally arrived, and halted with his entire suite below the walls of the fortress, but he was afraid to surrender himself before Tatishchev, making the excuse that it was not befitting the person of a sovereign to make the first visit to a general. He held to this idea primarily because of the arguments of the elders who accompanied him. However Tevkelev, as his coreligionist and an old acquaintance, reassured him and made him decide to renounce his proud claim. The assurance that he was surrendering himself to the imperial camp and not to the State Councilor Tatishchev made him reduce his pretentions and go to Orenburg, which was then no more than an armed camp.

The interview was scheduled for the month of August, 1738.

In order to give it greater pomp, and thus to strike the fancy of the Asiatics, who love pageantry in all things, a major

[193 cont.]
of 1741 gave reason to doubt the sincerity of their demonstrations and promises. We said above that Karasakal, chief of the Bashkir [167] rebels, had retreated to the Kazak hordes. It is not known which khan or sultan took him under protection, but it is recognized that having announced himself to be the brother of Galdan Tsyren, the general of the Dzungars, he went out and laid waste the settle- [726] ments of the latter people at the head of a large number of armed Kazaks. Galdan had been warned of this attack and sent to punish these brigands an army of 15,000 men, who pursued them [127] almost to Orenburg across the Kazak steppe and devastated the auls in their path, killing or taking away men and livestock. The subjects of Abul Mahmet and Ablai suffered most from this situation, which causes one to suppose that they had supported Karasakal and aided him, and that this had brought down all these misfortunes upon them. The swift advance of the Dzungars was stopped by the commander of Orenburg, who saw them approaching the border and sent word to them that they were violating the peace which existed between Russia and Galdan Tsyren. The head of the Dzungarian army withdrew at once, after declaring that neither he nor his master had been informed of the submission of the Kazaks to Russia, and that these peoples had made all their neighbors lose patience with them because of their constant brigandage. They were told that in future they should address their [194] complaints about the Middle and the Little Hordes to the Russian government and not take justice into their own hands. It can be imagined that neither Galdan nor his general could understand the justice of this diplomatic solution, and that they continued to act toward the new Russian subjects as they had during their independence.

This event made Abul Mahmet request the Russian government to erect a fortified city in the midst of the grazing lands of the Middle Horde. He knew that a similar promise had been made to Abulkhair, and he considered himself worthy of being treated on the same footing.

[726] Although the Kazaks had been given a strong lesson by the Dzungars, a still more terrible storm menaced them from the

[194 cont.]
[726] southwest. Shah Nadyr, the terror of Asia, was nearing Khiva, and once he had conquered it he could easily attack the Kazak hordes. The cabinet in St. Petersburg had already taken measures to fortify the new border along the Ural as much as possible. But this precaution was useless, for Nadyr passed around the Kazak steppes without paying any attention to it. He could not help but know that the conquest of a nomadic people is difficult in general, and that the booty which can be gained from it is practically nothing. Thus it is not surprising that he left the Kazaks in peace.

Abulkhair had seized Khiva in 1741 and was there when the Persian armies entered this country. At that time with him was Muravin, a geodetic officer who, as we said above, had been ordered in 1740 to explore the site on the Syr /Darya/ where Abulkhair had requested that a city be built. Relying upon this officer more than upon his sultans, Abulkhair sent him as his representative to meet the Shah to pay him his respects and to beg the latter to allow him to remain khan of Khiva. Nadyr received Muravin most graciously, gave him gifts in silver and clothing, and sent him back, directing him to tell Abulkhair to present himself in the Persian camp, where he would be received and rewarded as a subject of the [195] Empress of Russia, with whom the Shah wished to maintain peace and good terms (1).

[727]

1. As proof of his sincerity we cite the following fact: Zhanaiev, a Russian Tatar, brought to Samara ten Russian slaves who had been prisoners in Khiva. Nadyr freed them and gave each one 50 rubles and a horse to return home.

[726] Whether from fear, or from lack of faith in Nadyr's words, or because of a conspiracy plotted by the Khivans, Abulkhair refused to appear before the Persian conqueror and withdrew within his horde. After his departure the Khivans decided to resist the Persian army and shut themselves up in the city. Nadyr took it by assault in three days (2) and gave the people of Khiva one of

2. See in the archives of the Orenburg

[201 cont.]

[152] Meanwhile Abulkhair concealed his resentment and never ceased to give assurances to everyone of his devotion to Russia, asserting that all these attacks had been made by Kazaks who were disobeying him. He even went so far as to advise that they be penalized and punished by death (2).

2. See the letter of July, 1743 from Khan Abulkhair to Nepluev.

But when the troops were reinforced along the Russian border, and the Bashkirs profited by the absence of the Kazaks [727] to attack their auls and began to carry off their studs, Abulkhair thought seriously of halting the raids. But this was no longer in his power to do. His people, greedy for plunder, wished to be at peace only when they were alarmed by the advance of Russian troops across the Ural to go into the steppes to punish the [41] brigands. This was only a rumor, spread on purpose, no doubt, by the prudent head of the Orenburg region. Yet this was not where the true intentions of the Russian government lay. It did not wish to lose the regular army in pursuing nomad brigands in the desert wastes, but found it more advantageous to punish them through another people, as restless and as unfaithful as the Kazaks themselves. In a word, the government wished to arm the Kalmuks against them. In the meantime, Nepluev was ordered (3) to [202] try to seize Kazaks of the leading families

3. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 31, 1743.

as hostages. Either as a consequence of this order or for some other reason, Abulkhair suddenly delivered a considerable number of Russian subjects who had been taken prisoner by his horde during the most recent raids, and promised to return the others soon.

[724] The year 1744 not only failed to bring peace along the Russian border, but even increased the dangers of those who lived there, for Khan Abulkhair removed his mask and took an open part in the hostilities of his people. His more daring subjects continued

[205 cont.]
made no raids during the year 1745. Rychkov says (1), according

1. The continuation of his history of Orenburg.

to a Russian Cossack who was with the Little Horde then, that this year as in 1773, Khan Abulkhair incited his subjects to renew their raids on the right bank of the Ural, but on this occasion the people refused to obey. However we cannot accept this report as accurate for the following reasons:

1. The Kazaks were too accustomed to pillage to refuse the proposal of their khan to attack a foreign country, especially when they had not had a chance to test the force of its arms.

2. At that time Abulkhair's attention was directed to Khiva, whose inhabitants, attacked by those of Turkestan, had sent to him to ask help, and who although subjects of Persia wanted to have Sultan Nurali as khan later. He sent Nepluev the letters he had received from Khiva on this subject and asked his advice.

3. It was at this time that he swore an oath of loyalty in his aoul in the presence of a Russian officer, to Emperor Peter III, successor to Elizabeth, and afterwards liberated 30 prisoners, Russians as well as Kalmuks, who had been taken by his subjects.

4. He complained about Nepluev to the highest authorities (2),

2. See Abulkhair's letter and Nepluev's rescript of September 17, 1745 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

and indicated that except for his personal quarrel with this governor and the displeasure he had felt at the refusal to exchange [206] his son Khodja Akhmet for Chingis, he had no other cause for complaint against Russia nor any harmful intention.

As for the office of khan which had been proposed to the son in Khiva, Nepluev had sought by all possible means to persuade

[206 cont.]
[648] him in the name of the Empress (1) to make Abulkhair refuse it,

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 21, 1745.

but the latter would not have paid any attention to his advice if other circumstances had not prevented him from acceding to the wishes of the Khivans. Nurali received a letter from the son of the Shah of Persia inviting him to come to him. This prince considered the khanate of Khiva his property, being the conqueror. Nurali was on the point of departing for Khiva when his wife, whom he had left in that city, sent word that the Persians were only inviting him there in order to put him to death (2). This news kept

2. Continuation of the history of Orenburg by Rychkov, events of 1745.

him back with his father.

[643] Meanwhile the leaders of the Middle Horde, who had had no relation with Russia for nearly two years, approached the Russian border and renewed their assurances of devotion to the Empress. Abul Mahmet left Turkestan to join his horde and sent a messenger to St. Petersburg to volunteer his services; later he renewed his oath of loyalty. Sultan Barak did likewise. He also sent an embassy to St. Petersburg.

[668] The Kazaks were not yet at peace when disturbances took place in the Volga Kalmuk horde. The rumor spread that a large section wished to leave Russia, on the invitation of Galdan Tsyren, to join their compatriots, the Dzungars. This rumor, which was confirmed in fact 26 years later, was false at this time, but it disturbed the government, especially when the news had been received from the Ural that a large number of Kalmuks had crossed over from the Russian bank to the Kazak side, and [207] when reports from Siberia stated that the Dzungarian [726] armies had reached the Irtysh /River/ in some places. Subsequent [727] events showed that the passage of the Kalmuks across the Ural

[207 cont.]
River had no other end but to attack the Kazaks, from whom they took many horses at this time; meanwhile the Dzungarian army returned to its home in peace, and Galdan Tsyren, the leader, died (1746).

This retreat, which was soon followed by the destruction of the Dzungarian state, brought peace to the Siberian frontiers, but it did not cause the Volga Kalmuks to lose their desire to join their compatriots. In order to hinder this project as much as possible, and also to put an end to the pillaging between the Kalmuks and Kazaks, both peoples were strictly forbidden to cross the Ural /River/. Also a regiment of Russian troops was detailed to keep watch there and to show that in the future such infractions would not remain unpunished. The Kalmuk leaders who had taken part in the last raid against the Kazaks were treated as state criminals and punished in [sur] the Volga, in order to serve as an example to their compatriots.

It was hoped that these measures would restore peace between the two enemy hordes, but it was hoped in vain. It is possible that the strict prohibition to crossing the border and the punishment of several violators of this rule, by way of example, did have some effect upon the Kalmuks, but it did not stop the Kazaks, who had become accustomed for two or three years not only to pillaging the Kalmuks with impunity but also the Russians. The building of forts and fortified posts along the lower sectors of the Ural River could only hinder the raids against the Kalmuks but could not stop them. Careful observation indeed suggested to the Kazaks a way of surmounting this obstacle.

The northern part of the Caspian Sea freezes over during the winter, and during the great frosts not only may it be crossed by men and horses, but also the heaviest weights can be transported over the ice without any [208] danger. Profiting by this fact, in February, 1746 the Kazaks moved from their steppes to those of the Kalmuks across the ice, opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and they carried out such an impetuous and unexpected attack below Krasny Yar [Krasnoyarsk] against the Kalmuks that they carried off nearly 700 prisoners of both sexes, killed about

[208 cont.]
100 men, and led away an enormous number of livestock.

After this celebrated expedition, several small raids took place on the Russian border.

Khan Abulkhair was still the cause of these new plunderings. He continued to nurse a deep hatred of Nepluev and was angry because the government had not satisfied his complaints against the border authorities and had not given up his son Khodja Akhmet. For this reason he adopted the course of wreaking his vengeance against all the Russians. Not content with the wrong he had committed against Russia through the raids of his subjects, he took the advice of the latter and abused an interpreter whom Nepluev had sent to him with papers, did not let him out of sight, and detained him for about a year, tormenting him in different ways.

It was still too little. Abulkhair's fury was so blind that he sought to persuade his people to depart from Russia and go south into the sands and the waterless deserts. But the Kazaks knew the advantages of the lands neighboring Russia, and they openly refused to obey him in this case. His rage then fell upon those of his subjects who had opposed his plan to move, and he wrote to the border authorities to arrest these people when they entered fortified localities, as the fomenters of all the disturbances.

While he was thus delivering the innocent to punishment, he was preparing the true brigands for a new attack against the Volga Kalmuks and was only waiting for winter to send them off. In January, 1747, when the ice was strong enough on the Caspian Sea, they left their camps, successfully crossed [209] the ice opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and attacked the uluses of their enemies once again. But this time fortune betrayed them: the Kalmuks had been warned of the attack in time and retreated into the western part of their steppes. They were too far away, and it was too dangerous to pursue them; thus the bandits returned with empty hands. Then, to complete their misfortune, the ice began to melt, the passage across the ice became difficult, and they were obliged to cross the Ural River where the Yaik Cossacks, who had been sent against them, were waiting. The passage through the Russian troops was very costly, for when they had reached their shore, many dead were found there, and a greater number drowned in the river, for the ice had broken. Most of their horses fell into the hands of the Russians.

[221 cont.]
ordered that these stipends were not to start being paid until he had returned all the Russian prisoners and the Volga Kalmuks, or at least most of them. It was supposed that this would be carried out soon, but it turned out completely otherwise, and Nurali did not receive his stipends until five years after they had been assigned to him.

[222] At the beginning of 1750, Sultan Aichuvak, brother of the Khan, devised a plan, together with his father's friends, Batyr Djanibek, and a numerous band, composed partly of people of the Middle Horde but mostly made up of members of the Little Horde, to attack a people who lived near the Aral Sea and who were called the Aral people. These people were few in number and unaccustomed to war. One can easily guess that Aichuvak and his accomplices were successful in their enterprise and that they returned home with a large number of prisoners, studs of strange horses, and with many objects of different kinds which they had seized. But the Aral people were subjects of the khan of Khiva, who did not care to let the damage done to them pass without amends. Consequently he took into custody a large number of Nurali's subjects who had come to trade at the market in Khiva, and even his ambassador was arrested. There was no other way of releasing them than to return to the Aral people at least part of what they had lost, and especially the prisoners.

Shortly after this, Sultan Erali, following the example of his brother, attacked the Karakalpaks. But the troops which served as his army were too few, and in place of the booty he hoped for, he was taken prisoner and most of his companions were killed.

After having freed him, at the end of several months, Nurali arrived in Orenburg to see Nepluev and Tevkelev, but his journey did not have any important consequence.

Intercourse between the Middle Horde and Russia rarely took place at that time. Their khan, Abul Mahmet, had retreated to Turkestan where he lived until his death without being heard from; and Barak, as we have said, had been imprisoned /poisoned/. The successors to their power had not yet made the

[222 cont.]
acquaintance of the Russians. Sultan Kuchak, who had been proclaimed khan by several tribes, had not been confirmed by Russia and had not even sought her protection. The good graces of the Dzungarian prince were more necessary to him, as they were to all [223] the sultans of the Middle Horde. Only Ablai failed to renounce the protection of Russia, in spite of his secret relations with the Dzungars, for most of his subjects lived near the Russian border, and he sensed how useful it was to him to remain on good terms with Russia.

Since he had to look out for the advantages of trade with the Russians in addition to the interests of his security, he requested that a market be opened in the fort of Troitsk, saying that Orenburg was too far away for him and particularly for most of his subjects to go there.

Batyr Djanibek, who had moved away from Orenburg after Abulkhair's death, asked for the same thing. The fulfillment of this request was equally advantageous to the Russian government, giving it greater means of surveillance over the Great Horde, and consequently a trade market was opened at Troitsk in 1750.

Before his death Galdan Tsyren had become reconciled with the Kazaks and seemed to wish to attach them to him more by kindness and good deeds than by terror. But his son had an entirely different view of the matter and renewed his attacks. The Middle Horde especially suffered greatly in 1751 near the Ulu Mountains. The considerable loss of men taken prisoner by the Dzungars made it necessary for most of this horde to come closer to the Russian border and almost to mix with the Little Horde, after reaching the Ori River and the Mugodzhar Hills.

In 1752 Russia's relations with Nurali Khan had less to do with Kazak matters than with the expansion of caravan trade with Khiva, the dominion of Bukhara, and Tashkent, and across these lands with the other states of Central Asia, even to the Indies, which were regarded as the source of all riches. Since the Indies were not far from the Kazak steppes, it was wished to make the first step across this country to reach that [224] region. This is why Nurali's help, if he were to give it in good faith, would have been of great importance to Russia in connection with trade.

[231 cont.]

x 648 Fortunately this region was then governed by Nepluev. His [643 722] presence of mind and his actions averted the storm which menaced it. He immediately united the troops under his command at the points where defense was most necessary. He had reinforcements brought in from Kazan and also drew them from the Don Cossacks and from the khan of the Volga Kalmuks. While waiting, he armed the Meshcheriaks and Teptiars against the Bashkirs. He promised a complete pardon to those rebels who showed signs of repentance, and offered large pecuniary rewards for the heads of Batyr Shah and his principal accomplices. He sent declarations in the Tatar language to the Kazak hordes in the name of the akhun of Orenburg, in which this senior member of the Moslem clergy expressed his approbation of the Bashkir revolt but at the same time his fear that if they came to make themselves independent of Russia they might attack the Kazaks and finish by conquering them.

[726] When the auxiliary troops had entered the land of the Bashkirs, the latter were not powerful enough to resist the Russians, Kalmuks, Teptiars, and Meshcheriaks together, and they fled across the Ural River with their wives and children, numbering more than 50,000 persons. A large number perished crossing the [727 662] river, and the others concealed themselves within the hordes. Those who remained in their settlements asked pardon, but their repentance was not sincere, and they were waiting for a new revolt. To avert this, and above all to prevent the Bashkirs from joining the Kazaks, Nepluev was obliged to take a cruel measure, but one which the times and circumstances made absolutely necessary.

x 648 He felt that it was necessary, for the security of the [232] 662 Orenburg line, to cause an irreconcilable hatred between the 661 Bashkirs and the Kazaks, for without this a reunion between them was always possible, and the inevitable result of such an alliance would be the ruin of all the Russian establishments on the Ural River. To achieve this end, he decided to place in the power of the Kazaks the wives and children of the Bashkirs who had left Russia to seek refuge among the Kazaks. Elizabeth's ministry had wished to protect the Russian border by a method more consistent with the views of kindness and humanity, but it was necessary to yield to

[233 cont.]

[648 663 661] the southern region of that river for their own safety. At the same time the border commanders were directed not to permit its crossing from either side, and guards were reinforced for this end.

[727 728] The bloodshed diminished, but the hatred between the two peoples has continued to this day. Mutual reprisals from time to time have helped to maintain it.

[661] These results could cause the Russian government to be accused of cruelty. But let us examine the circumstances: if one takes a glance at the geographical position of the military line and the region of Orenburg, one can see what sorts of people occupy it and its outlying areas. On the other hand, if one notes the small number of troops covering the Russian border, it will be granted that the measure taken by Nepluev was the only one which could save the region he governed, and perhaps most of the southeast part of Russia. The Kazaks who lived beyond the military line would not have been the only supporters of the Bashkirs. They could have joined the Tatars of Kazan, Orenburg, Simbirsk, and Penza, who lived in the interior of the empire, and even the Teptiars and Meshcheriaks, who because of the wise measures of the [234] Orenburg authorities served to punish the rebels instead [771] of revolting. All these peoples profess the same religion, and with all of them recognizing Mohammed and seeing the Christians only as infidels (kashfyr /sic/), what could one expect from their joining together?

If these matters are considered impartially, one sees that Russia had to decide to sacrifice either the Bashkirs or the Russians. If she sacrificed the former in order to save the latter, this conduct cannot be deserving of any blame.

[661] Khan Nurali as well as his two brothers, Erali and Aichuvak, did much to help the Orenburg authorities find the Bashkirs who had fled beyond the Ural River and to bring them back to the borders. In order to please Russia they not only fought the deserters, but also those Kazaks who defended them. Although this zeal was not entirely disinterested, still, since it was accompanied by other signs of being favorably disposed, the

[236 cont.]
648 that its probability be considered and also the basis for it. From
662 information received about the Little Horde from an officer (1)
721

1. See Prince Urakov's reports of 1757 in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

who was sent there for the purpose, it was found out that the Kazaks had had no thought of the Kuban, but that Dunduk Dashi and two other Kalmuk princes had themselves sent confidential agents to Khan Nurali to warn him that the Crimean Tatars intended to attack Russia and to invite him to give them help, as the Kalmuks had themselves decided to do. Nurali had not rejected this proposal, but he had asked that he be warned of the moment when the Tatars would carry out their plan.

648 This duplicity on the part of Dunduk Dashi and his Kalmuk
661 subjects' eternal hatred of the Kazaks caused the presumption
662 that his real aim was to decide Nurali to march against the Russians and to profit by the absence of a large part of the Little Horde to attack its defenseless auls.

However this is only a presumption, and events did not prove that it was true. For neither the Crimean Tatars nor the Kazaks attacked Russia in 1757, and consequently the Volga Kalmuks had no occasion to help the first nor to destroy the second.

648 [237] The behavior of the Middle Horde in 1758 disturbed the Russian government more than the rumors of Nurali's alliance with the Crimean khan. Part of this horde had invaded the
● [727] borders and taken the liberty of carrying off 220 Tatars of the Kuznetsk district as prisoners, people known by the name of Dvoedantsy (this name means "those who pay double tribute, or two tributes"). The Russians and the Dzungars levied tribute on these people at the same time. Another part of the Middle Horde, and this was the largest part, having seized the lands of the Dzungars who had been driven from their country, were coming closer to China and seemed too devoted to that empire.

[240 cont.]

not ceased their thieving and laid waste the border provinces as before. But the departure of the Kazaks would have been very injurious in regard to trade, and it was to prevent this that Russia wished to keep her semisavage subjects in their old habitat.

It was essential to keep Sultan Ablai well disposed toward Russia, for he was acquiring more influence over his subjects every day and was becoming more fitted than anyone else to drive them in some high undertaking. A large part of the Middle Horde had already given him the title of khan. He himself in his relations with the Russian authorities did not yet give himself more than the title of sultan. But his power and his rank as a Chinese prince, to which Ch'ien Lung had elevated him, made it easier for him to change his title and to adopt that of supreme chief of all the Middle Horde, without any permission or cooperation on the part of Russia. This manner of behavior would have been contrary to the dignity of the empire, for the Middle Horde was among its subjects. But it was impossible to prevent such an event by [241] prohibiting it, and it would have been too injurious to take revenge by force of arms. It was therefore decided to induce Ablai by kindness and favors to himself request his investiture with the title of khan in the name of his people. In anticipation of this request, he was assigned an annual stipend, and an officer was sent to him charged with subtly showing him the path by which he could acquire the position of khan and to inform him that in order to reach this goal it was necessary that he give his son as hostage, following the example of Nurali.

Against all expectations Ablai received the Russian envoy in a very unfriendly manner and refused to present his son. In addition, it was learned soon after from a reliable source that Abul Mahmet, who had been created the khan of the Middle Horde by Russia, was still alive, and therefore the elevation of a new khan was put off to another time.

In 1760 the Kirghiz-Kazaks of the Middle Horde attacked the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, and inflicted great losses upon them. Later they caused a disturbance in a sector of the new conquests of China and took several prisoners there. The Chinese demanded

K [257 cont.]
x648 undefended. No one could protect them from the raids of outside
C enemies, for everyone thought about saving himself from an
648 enemy from within who was far more dangerous. This is why
K there was reason to fear then that the Kazaks [258] might join
C the rebels, enter the empire, and pillage and lay waste all the
669 border settlements. This did not happen because the Yaik Cossacks
662 and the Bashkirs who made up Pugachev's army were enemies of
the Kazaks.

Nevertheless, if this hatred prevented them from joining together to march into the interior, it did not protect the borders from the usual pillaging and raids which the Little Horde often repeated during Pugachev's revolt.

We see by a report from the commander who was then in the city of Yaisk (now Uralsk) that Nurali had armed quite a large number of his subjects but was making no move, waiting near the border for the outcome of the affair. One might suppose from the assurances he gave and the zeal with which he extradited several rebels who had taken flight that it was his intention to decide for the legitimate government, but in spite of this the local authorities were very much afraid that in case good luck favored the leader of the insurrection, Nurali might join him.

On this basis and to punish several raids, some across the borders, by the Kazaks during the revolt, the government of Orenburg sent a body of troops against the Little Horde in 1774, after the defeat of the rebels. These troops succeeded in capturing a large number of prisoners, carrying off many animals, and made the audacious bandits feel Russia's might.

K At this same time an event took place in the interior of
643 the Little Horde which is worthy of attention. Several Turkmen
659 tribes who nomadized near the Caspian Sea chose Sultan Pirali, the second son of Nurali, for their khan. The new sovereign immediately left his father and went to live in the midst of his new subjects on the route which led from Khiva to Saraichik [259] and Guryev. He soon made a name for himself through the high duties he exacted from the merchant caravans.

K In 1775 the Kazaks did not disturb Russia. The Little
727 Horde remained quiet because it still felt the painful consequences

[259 cont.]

×648 of the punishment inflicted upon it by the Russian troops the year
[727] before. The Middle Horde had been causing suspicion for some time because the rumor had spread that Ablai, profiting from the recent troubles of the Bashkirs, had sent several messengers to them to induce them to move under his domination. But investigations proved that these rumors were false.

During the months of June and October of this same year, several elders and sultans who were independent of Ablai sent deputies to the commander of the Siberian line to propose that
[661] they be recognized as Russian subjects. Among these was the son of Khan Abul Mahmet, Abulfeis, who had asked that he be assigned an annual stipend. Ablai's son and nephew asked for the same thing.

Empress Catherine received the report and replied in a rescript of May 25, 1776 in the name of the governor of Orenburg, as the principal administrator of Kazak matters, that the individual proposals made by the Kazaks of the Middle Horde to be received as subjects were founded on nothing more than the desire to obtain gifts. It was added that they were completely useless, for the entire horde had been recognized as subjects of the empire since the reign of Empress Anna, and that if such demands were satisfied this would only produce new demands. Furtheremore it was said that the fixing of annual stipends would become an obligation for the government and would accustom the Kazaks to regard as a duty that which was only the effect of the government's indulgence, and consequently it would be much better to conciliate them with gifts which were not fixed. These concepts showed a profound knowledge of the character of the Kazaks; they were the fruit of 46 years experience, from 1730 to 1776.

×648 Irnazar Maksiutov, the Bukharan ambassador, who came to
439 [260] Russia in 1775, revived the idea of building a Russian city in the Kazak steppe at the mouth of the Emba in the conferences he had on the means of removing the trade of caravans between Russia and Bukhara from all danger. The Russian government showed itself ready to carry out the plan (1), but it remained without

1. As a result of the ukase given on this

[262 cont.]
sent a [263] high officer to the horde, who joined the family of the deceased and celebrated a ceremonial funeral service in its presence.

Thus ended Ablai's relations with Russia. Although the disobedience of this prince in the last years of his life was open, yet it had no important consequences. The Little Horde, whose khan seemed entirely devoted to Russia and proved this by his actions, was much more disturbing to the borders, as it continued its raids and brigandage as usual. As we saw earlier, in 1775 the Empress had forbidden the sending of troops beyond the Ural to chastise the Kazaks, and although not only the Orenburg authorities but the Khan himself had asked that this measure be employed again in 1776, it was not done. The supreme government had made up its mind to substitute gentle means for severity. This system, which was so favorable to the Kazaks, did not last long. Their plundering forced it to be changed. Nurali himself again declared the absolute urgency of punishing the guilty persons. As a result, on October 4, 1779, the Empress gave orders to the governor of Orenburg, by a rescript, not only to pursue the bandits with armed force, but, as before, to seize their kinsmen if necessary, or even their neighbors, so that the families of these neighbors would make an effort to deliver the guilty persons or at least to force the return of the Russians who had been held prisoner.

According to tradition, the southern part of the Middle Horde underwent a terrible defeat from the Great Horde after Ablai's death, being attacked and having many animals taken away. Those who had suffered did not remain quiet but avenged themselves upon their enemies. The northern part of the Middle Horde took no part in these reprisals. This horde chose as the successor to Ablai his son Vali, and the latter esteemed the protection of Russia and did not wish to be at odds with her. As a result he asked her to [264] confirm his new position. His request was fulfilled, and in 1782 he was proclaimed the khan of the Middle Horde by Lieutenant General Jacobi in the fort of Petropavlovsk. The ceremonies observed on this occasion were the same as those which the Russian government observes at every installation of a khan. We have already spoken of them.

[265 cont.]

x 648 begun by Ablai. But the Buruts, who were accustomed to con-
[721] stant fighting, were not easy to defeat. The Chinese also experienced the effects of their valor several times and sometimes were vanquished by them. Thus it is not surprising that Sultan Tyz, who rashly attacked them with a handful of men, was
● [727 728] defeated and taken prisoner, and he emerged from prison only under humiliating conditions and after giving them the slaves which belonged to him.

[721] The elder Berdy Khoja suffered still more from the Buruts (1). He ruled the part of the Middle Horde which

1. This same Berdy Khoja came to the fort of Semipalatinsk in the month of July, 1785 and imparted the information to the Russians which we have given here about Ablai's son and on the Buruts. This was published for the first time in Sibirskii Vestnik, Bk. III, 1820, and we have taken it from this source.

nomadized near the Chinese borders, and often fought against the savage Kirgiz, winning battles against them frequently. In 1785 he won quite an important victory over them, but it was his last. Acting as an auxiliary of the Chinese army, which was marching against them from the shores of the Ili, he advanced swiftly from the shores of the Ayaguz and gave them a terrible rebuff. Encouraged by his success he set out again with a small number of his men and halted on his arrival at the Jidisse /Djidis?/ to await reinforcements. The Buruts took advantage of his
[727] weakness and attacked him during the first night, defeating him and taking him prisoner. The unfortunate elder, in despair, knowing the customs of his enemies, could no longer hope for good luck in the future, and resolving to hasten his death, he killed one of the Buruts who was [266] leading him to the chief of the tribe. The others could not endure the idea of letting this act pass unpunished for an instant. They stopped on the way

[266 cont.]

[148] and put Berdy Khoja to death in the most barbarous manner. They [127] cut off his head, his feet, and his hands, and then they opened his stomach and put all the dismembered parts into it.

The revenge which was exacted for this execrable assassination showed that if the Kazaks were less valorous than the Buruts, they yielded nothing to them in ferocity. Ak-Kaiak, the brother of Berdy Khoja, and his sons Lepes and Choka, in a fortunate battle with the Buruts, managed to capture the son of the elder of the latter group and to bring him to their village. There the wives of Berdy Khoja threw themselves upon the unfortunate prisoner. Each of them wanted to kill him. It was a question of who would inflict the most wounds upon him, and he finally died under their blows.

[121] Let us return to the Little Horde. It was an object of concern to the Russian government in many respects during the ten years from 1781 to 1791. Above all, the goal of these concerns was to re-establish order and peace, but they had no success and often found themselves obliged to have recourse to arms in order to punish the bandits who never ceased to make raids over the Orenburg border in defiance of all kinds of reproof.

Having firmly resolved to introduce some kind of order among the Kazaks and from there to come little by little to fixed regulations, in 1872 Empress Catherine commanded first, the establishment of a special border administration under the name of the expedition of the borders, whose duty would be to use [233 166] every possible means to carry out Her Majesty's benevolent intentions toward the Kazaks; and second, she abolished the prohibition against allowing the livestock of the Kazaks to enter within the line to spend the winter (1). Third, she gave strict

1. Besides, it is well to note that in spite of this prohibition the Kazaks [267] often crossed the Ural River secretly and came to spend the winter with their animals in the Astrakhan steppes.

[266 cont.]
x 648 orders to the authorities to keep [267] constant and vigorous watch upon the maintenance of justice, desiring that they grant the Kazaks every possible protection and help (1). Fourth, large

1. This wish of Empress Catherine was written in her hand, December 27, 1782 on the report from the commander of Orenburg, Lieutenant General Apukhtin.

[346] sums of money were given to build mosques on the borders of Orenburg and Siberia, to which schools and caravansaries were to be attached.

[177] By assembling all these establishments at the principal points of the border, the Empress intended not only to bring the Kazaks closer to the Russians but also to moderate their ways.

Exertions and expenditures were all in vain, for the Kazaks showed not the slightest desire to be civilized. In the [721] following year (1783) they did so much damage with their raids that it was impossible not to use armed force to punish them. Consequently, in the month of February, 1784, a detachment of 3,462 men was sent beyond the Ural River, and when they were unable to find the guilty persons, they seized 43 Kazaks who had [727] not taken any part in the last raids, in order to force them to x 648 give up the prisoners. Their kinsmen were exasperated by this 721 injustice and immediately crossed to the right bank of the Ural 726 to avenge themselves. Independently of this attack, the residents along the border were laid waste at other points by Kazaks who were not pillaging for vengeance but for the love of pillage (2). A certain Syrym Batyr stood out among them, and

2. In 1784 the Kazaks captured 176 Russians, and 175 in 1786. Who knows how many more they killed?

we will soon point him out as a man chosen to be the instrument of the most important revolutions among the Kazaks. Meanwhile

[267 cont.]
X648 721 726 we will say that his raids and those of his partisans forced the Russians to send two [268] detachments of troops beyond the Ural. The first was composed of 2,760 men and was sent from the Ural toward the source of the Emba. The second, of 1,250 Cossacks, was sent from Uralik /Uralsk?/ toward the mouth of that same river. Snow prevented these troops from acting according to their instructions, but nevertheless the expedition was not entirely useless. They seized 213 women and children, for [727] whose ransom a large number of Russians who had been captured earlier were given up.

X648 439 712 It will be understood that such conditions were not of a sort to make caravan trade flourish between Russia and Central Asia. For a long time the khans' promises to protect the caravans had not been believed. Long experience had made their weakness known. Nor could it be hoped to restore the brigands to reason for a long period of time. For this reason means were sought to establish the safety of trade by force of arms. It was proposed, to this end, to build forts on the Emba and Temir rivers and defenses on the route from these two points to Iletsk [Sol-Iletsk], or to set up only one fortification on Mangyshlak [Peninsula] on the Caspian Sea and to send the caravans from Guryev by sea. Thus from Orenburg to Guryev they could follow the route along the Nizhne-Uralsk line in complete safety.

One of these plans was not carried out, partly because of the extraordinary difficulties which had to be surmounted and partly because the old trade routes were very advantageous to the Khivans and Bukharans, for although the new ones would have been safer, they still would not have been entirely safe from attack.

X648 692 The Orenburg border commission controlled matters pertaining to the Kazaks, or rather it examined all the relations of the government with this people, but it could not study the individual disputes which arose between the residents on the two sides of the line. The [269] Empress, in order to remedy this, conceived the plan of establishing a tribunal in whose operations the Kazaks would take the same part as the Russians, and which would serve them as a school of justice. This at least was what

[270 cont.]
X 648 721 had been provoked. This band was composed of 3,000 men under the command of Batyr Syrym, of whom we have already spoken. For a long time it threatened several forts on the Orenburg line, [726] and finally this daring band succeeded in winning a considerable victory at the fort of Tanalytsk and against a body of troops sent against them.

X 648 668 In 1785 a revolution began in the internal administration of the Little Horde, which is of great note to the historian and very interesting to the political scientist. The end for which it was undertaken held to the plan conceived by Catherine and her ministry to establish peace among the Kazaks. We shall describe the means by which the local authorities attained such a desirable result. Baron Igelstrom, who was then appointed to the post of governor general of Orenburg and commander of the entire Russian border from the Caspian Sea to the Tobolsk gubernia, found the Little Horde in a state of violent agitation and the borders of the [721 provinces in his care in danger. Troops of armed Kazaks riding ●727] about the left bank of the Ural River caused the constant fear of an attack and kept the peasants from busying themselves with the work in the fields. And whenever they found a chance, they carried men off, pillaged, and led away the livestock. The detachment commanded by Batyr Syrym showed itself even more daring.

X 648 721 662 His attack on the fort of Tanalytsk was one of the first events which took place after the arrival of Baron Igelstrom in Orenburg. In order to take advantage of this fact, Khan Nurali hastened to inform the new governor that all the brigandage was committed by Kazaks who were defying his orders; that Syrym was not satisfied with denying his authority, but was even arousing the entire horde against him, and that in order [271] to prevent the greatest disasters, both for Russia and for the Kazaks, it was indispensable to punish the rebels by force and to remove the fomenters of disorder from the horde. The Khan concluded as before by acknowledging his weakness and requesting help to bring the bandits to their proper duties.

[271 cont.]

All this was true, but no one paid any attention to it because no one in Orenburg believed in Nurali's sincerity, and the new government, being prejudiced against him, believed the re-establishment of peace in the horde to be impossible without changing its administration, or at least without a new khan.

Baron Igelstrom's first choice for a new khan was Kaip, son of Sultan Batyr, who had reigned in Khiva and was driven out for his rapaciousness and cruelty. We have spoken of him several times, as well as of his father. The central government could not ignore the acts of hostility committed by this sultan against the Russians, nor his conduct in Khiva, and therefore his election was put off until more detailed information could be collected concerning him (1). And in the end it did not take place (2).

1. Rescript from the Empress to Baron Igelstrom of November 25, 1785.

2. A similar rescript of November 12, 1786.

Kaip was proposed for this position twice. The first proposal was brought about by two plans drawn up by Baron Igelstrom, who had firmly decided to introduce a new form of government in the Little Horde.

In one of these plans he proposed to divide the horde into three sections, according to the number of its descent lines, namely those of Semirod, Baiulin, and Alimul, and to give each a khan, but to limit the authority of these new chiefs so that they would bear only an honorary title and be, in effect, only the executors of the commands of the supreme head of the government of Orenburg.

[272] The other plan was to abolish the position of khan in the Little Horde completely and gradually to apply to them the code given by Catherine for the administration of guberniyas.

This last thought was drawn from one of the cherished as well as most remarkable works of the Empress, and thus it was especially commended and confirmed in St. Petersburg.

[273 cont.]
privileges which the latter held by birth, Syrym proposed that the position of khan was unnecessary and sought to make up for his own lack of illustrious ancestors by personal merit. Under his influence the national assembly swore the oath of loyalty to the empress of Russia without the least opposition, promised to stop its raids, and to apply its efforts to maintain peace in the horde and to obey all the commands of the Russian government. But it demanded as a guarantee of Russia's protection, that Abulkhair's descendants, including Nurali himself, should forever lose the right to be khans of the Little Horde.

Can one fail to recognize Syrym's ambition in this demand? Nurali and his brothers were poor leaders because of their weakness, not because of their cruelty. Thus they could not have incurred the hatred of the entire horde to the point of forcing it to consider their removal from power as necessary to their peace. Then the government even went so far as to say that it was no longer up to it to change the course of affairs, because the idea of abolishing the position of khan had long since been adopted. Moreover, the peaceful inclinations of the national assembly and Syrym's clever actions seemed favorable to the re-establishment of calm within the horde.

[274] Actually, the year 1786 stood out among all other years, especially the two preceding, because of the calm which reigned during its span and the more frequent relations between the Russians and the Kazaks. It is true that there were also several disturbances springing from the abasement of all the sultans, especially the descendants of Abulkhair. Nevertheless this does not prevent our notice of the fact that the greatest exchanges of [439] livestock (1) on the line took place in 1786 and 1787, and in the

1. See the table on the quantity of livestock exchanged by the Kazaks with the Russians from 1745 to 1820 that we have included in the statistical article [pp. 426 to 427, not translated].

[274 cont.]
course of these two years fewer prisoners were taken on the border than in the 13 years from 1782 to 1794 (2). Likewise,

2. As proof, we include here the following table for these 13 years. Along the line which extends from the fort of Zverinogolovsk to Guryev, the Kazaks took 34 prisoners in 1782.

21	"	" 1783
176	"	" 1784
175	"	" 1785
12	"	" 1786
2	"	" 1787
43	"	" 1788
53	"	" 1789
90	"	" 1790
34	"	" 1791
40	"	" 1792
60	"	" 1793
42	"	" 1794

in 1786 his subjects released quite a large number of Russians from slavery, up to the time Nurali was banished from the horde after Ufa had been fixed as his place of exile and the detention of his brother Aichuvak at Uralsk. That same year 45,000 tents spent the winter inside the Russian borders and crossed the Ural River again in the spring without permitting the slightest infraction of the peace.

The first effects of the new system of administration of the Little Horde could not fail to be pleasing [275] both to the Empress, who ardently desired to establish order among the Kazaks, and to the supreme commander of the border, who was approaching the goal indicated to him by the advice of his sovereign and who saw the possibility of pleasing her by insuring the prosperity of an entire people. Occupied with these thoughts,

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During the winter of 1797-98, a strong detachment of Ural Cossacks crossed the Ural River and not only defeated the robbers but in exchange for the studs which had been taken from them in Russia, they carried off several thousands of horses, which were distributed to those who had suffered losses. Shortly afterward they were attacked by the Bashkirs, who took 5,000 horses from them.

It can be imagined that the Kazaks did not leave these two losses unavenged. The result was new raids, new reprisals, and new insults from one side and the other. In order to put an end to these disturbances, commissions were established on the borders composed of deputies of the Bashkir, Kazak, and Kalmuk peoples, as well as the Ural and Orenburg Cossacks. These commissions were supposed to examine the complaints which came to them from all sides and to satisfy them as much as possible, as well as to try to suppress permanently demands which were unjust or impossible to satisfy.

[290] These commissions did not fulfill the object of their meeting, and indeed scarcely set about satisfying the duties imposed on them, for no one appeared at the tribunal.

At this time many Kazaks from different hordes asked to establish themselves permanently in Russia. Their requests were answered in an ukase of September 30, 1797, as a consequence of which 12,000 tents of the Middle Horde alone are settled down in various localities to this day.

After Ishim's death the government of the Little Horde was entrusted to a council composed of Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair, as president, and six councilors, two from each tribe. They were all chosen by Baron Igelstrom, who was then commanding the Orenburg border area for the second time and had once again given the government the idea of maintaining the Kazaks without the intermediary of a khan. When Emperor Paul had sent a confirmation of his demands, he chose the Khobda River as the permanent residence of the council and had it opened in this region by the mufti Mohammed Djan Hussein, who was sent from Orenburg in 1797. The councilors took an oath of loyalty and swore to carry out their duties zealously, and the mufti remained with them

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descent lines of the Middle Horde and chose to live much farther to the east than the former. Others withdrew to the mouth of the Syr[Darya], and after overthrowing the Karakalpaks, they chose Sultan Abulgazi Kaip as khan.

A third group attacked the Turkmen, and after forcing them to give up part of their lands, they occupied a large part of the isthmus which separates the Aral Sea from the Caspian Sea. Aichuvak himself and several sultans with [292] him were obliged to cross the Ural River to save their lives and to remain in Russia until this general fermentation was calmed.

Sultan Bukei, son of Nurali, who had had the place of president in the council of the khan, did the same, but he followed a different course. He lived near the border of the government of Astrakhan, and knowing that after the departure of the Kalmuks, many lands had remained deserted which were suitable for pasturage, he decided in 1799 to leave forever the steppes beyond the Ural River and to go over into the territory called Ryn Peski. Having decided thus and hoping to become an independent khan soon, Bukei addressed himself to General Knorring, the governor general of Georgia and Astrakhan, begging for permission to occupy the lands he had chosen between the Ural and the Volga and the freedom to transport there the Kazaks in his auls, while assigning him 100 Cossacks with their officers in order to maintain order.

It was impossible to neglect a proposal which was so advantageous and so useful. Governor Knorring brought it to the attention of Emperor Paul, who, by an ukase of March 11, 1801, commanded that it be put into execution.

Without losing time, Bukei prepared to move into Russia about the autumn of that same year. The Kazaks who followed him belonged mostly to the Baiulin descent line. There were few of the Alimul line and almost none from that of the Semirod. All of them together comprised about 10,000 tents. Once they had occupied the Ryn Peski, they promptly became a clear and striking demonstration of the effects of a peaceful life. While their compatriots beyond the Ural River, ruined and exhausted by their

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dissensions, came to sell their children in Russian villages, Bukei's subjects not only remained peaceful but also became rich to the point that their herds and studs increased almost tenfold in the course of seven or eight years. It seemed that [293] such an attractive example for every nomadic people should have inspired the Kazaks to follow it, but their love for their savage freedom and their homeland was more powerful than any example.

It is time to return to the history of the Middle Horde, which we interrupted at the moment when Vali, son of Ablai, became khan. Our silence concerning this part of the Kazak people has been due, first, to the uninterrupted continuation of the events which took place in the Little Horde during the last 20 years of the last century, second, to the monotonous calm in the Middle Horde during this period, and third, to the fact that this very calm makes the external relations of the horde with Russia, as well as the events which took place within the horde, unremarkable.

The statement of these reasons no doubt causes every reader to wonder why the Middle Horde enjoyed and still enjoys today more tranquillity than the Little Horde, even though the two hordes are composed of one and the same people. In our opinion two circumstances have produced this difference: the situation of the lands occupied by the two hordes, and the difference in ways, partly arising from this geographical position and partly from other causes. We shall explain ourselves in greater detail.

The Little Horde has its compatriots for neighbors only to the east. In the south it is often attacked by the Khivans, in the north it has the Bashkirs, its irreconcilable enemies, and in the west it has suffered much in the past from the Ural Cossacks. Thus, having had to sustain violent attacks from all sides, it has not been able to remain at peace for long and has grown accustomed to disturbances and to raids into neighboring territories. In addition, the khans are always distinguished for their weakness. The Middle Horde, on the contrary, occupies the lands which have the Little Horde to the west. To the east it has its compatriots of the Great Horde and the establishments of the Chinese border. In the north is the [294] Siberian line, whose inhabitants are

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In 1793, Lieutenant General Strandman, commandant of the Siberian line, sent a body of troops into the Kazak steppes which liberated the Turkmen prisoners. Vali was so distressed at this loss that he complained to the Empress. The only satisfaction he received was the permission to come to St. Petersburg to explain all his needs and his requests, and he did not take advantage of this because he was afraid to leave the horde. Finally, after the death of his brother Chingis, he announced that all his complaints had been made on the advice of his brother, and he reconciled himself with the local authorities and promised to help them in all matters.

This move, however, was not a proof of perfect devotion to Russia, for he wished to maintain his relations with China, following the example of his father, and to this end he sent his son to the emperor of China in the winter of 1794-95 to bear witness to his submission. At the same time he continued to oppress the tribal chiefs, except those who were attached to Russia. The result of this behavior was that in January, 1795 two sultans, 19 elders, 43,360 of their subjects and 79,000 other Kazaks submitted a petition to the Empress asking to be delivered from Vali's rule and to be accepted under the direct dominion of the Russian government.

The execution of this demand was too difficult and promised no advantage to Russia. In the meantime Vali showed signs of repentance and raised the hope that he would become reconciled with the malcontents, and therefore things remained in their original state.

The part of the horde which lived along the Verkhne-Uralsk line and had the Bashkirs for neighbors, as we said above, in 1795 gave the most [296] convincing proof of the truth of our reflections about the causes which made the Middle Horde more peaceful than the Little Horde. At the time when the tribes and divisions of the Kazaks along the border were peacefully carrying on trade with the Russians on the Siberian line, it made several raids in the districts of Chelyabinsk and Verkhne-Uralsk, laid waste several villages then, took many prisoners, and carried off quite a large number of

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[646] [727] studs, to avenge themselves for the thefts and offenses committed against them by the Bashkirs. Finally, this group decided to withdraw into the depths of their steppes and did not agree to come near the Russian borders except on the invitation of General Viazmitinov, the commander in chief of the Orenburg region.

[692] In 1798 it was ordered that a tribunal be established, after the example of the Little Horde and on the request of Khan Vali, in the fort of Petropavlovsk, for the judgment of suits and disputes between the Kazaks of the Middle Horde and the residents along the Siberian border. This tribunal, made up of deputies of these two peoples, was organized in 1800, but the Kazak members let several years pass without appearing, so that it was not opened until 1806.

Here we end the detailed description of the Kazak hordes. [114] Having shown everything which took place among these peoples until the end of the 18th century, we will not speak of the events of the 19th century. The time which has passed since its beginning is still too close to us, and the judgments we could bring to this period would seem either partial, or misplaced, or doubtful.

We consider it necessary, however, to mark the transition between the past and the present by indicating briefly the order of succession of the khans of the Middle Horde and the Little Horde of the Kazaks.

[643] [578] Vali, who succeeded his father in 1781, reigned until his death, which came in 1818. However in his last years he was not the sole khan of the Middle Horde, for because of [297] his quarrels with several tribal chiefs and at the request of several Kazaks, in 1816 Emperor Alexander designated a second khan for this horde, who was Bukei, son of Barak, and who died in 1818.

[631] With him the title of khan died out in the Middle Horde. Today it is divided into districts and governed by a special regulation which we will enter at the end of this work. [This section not translated.]

[643] Aichuvak ruled the Little Horde until 1805 and then abdicated of his own accord because of old age and illness.

His successor was his son Djantiura, who was assassinated by his cousins, the sons of Khan Nurali, and their accomplices.